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Broadly speaking, we usually differentiate between persons
according to two sets of criteria - one in terms of social
inequality in respect of power, wealth or prestige, the other
in terms of an ascribed and often primordial characteristic,
descent or religion. At one extreme the two criteria can
be congruent - the social ranking is perpetuated from one
generation to another; at the other extreme there can be a
high degree of incongruity. Most African post-colonial
states are of the latter pattern in that the dominant western
educated elite has been drawn from a wide social base,
spanning rich and poor families in the several ethnic groups
which comprise the state. In this situation one refers
often to the dichotomy between class and ethnicity in
that there seem to be rival and largely incompatible criteria
for the organisation of social groups. It is not that one
has to decide whether Nigeria has a class structure or not,
ethnic groups or not; but that one has to distinguish
situations in which values or demands are expressed in terms
of one or the other criterion.
The same distinction can be explored at the international
level in the incompatibility of class and nationalism.
It is true that we usually study social class as an intra-
national phenomenon; and it is obvious that the workers of a
western industrial state have few interests in common with
(and perhaps some opposed to) those of the peasantry of an
African state - let alone a consciousness of shared interests.
But the elites of the industrial and African states do have much
in common. Often they are products of the same universities
in the metropolitan country. They are in similar professional
bureaucratic and managerial occupations. Often they are
employees of international organisations - for example,
the multinational firm or a United Nations agency. It is
inconceivable therefore that situations arise in which
their "class" interests are incompatible with those of their
"national" interests.
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One problem which arises at this point lies in
defining the "class" interests of the educated elite of the
African state. In other situations one finds it easy to
describe the interests of a landowning aristocracy or an
industrial bourgeoisie; they are owners of the means of
productíon and our everyday class terminology seems readily
applicable. But the African elite is a meritocracy, employed
largely in the public service, and would be in the same domi-
nant position if the state were "capitalist" or "socialist".
We distinguish with ease the attempts of land or factory or
factory owners to protect their interests from encroachment;
but what interests are the civil servants guarding?
Let me illustrate my argument, henceforth, from a small
part of Africa - the Yoruba-speaking area of Lagos and
southwest Nigeria; for though this area has, like any other
part, many peculiarities of its own, yet in broad terms the
situation is of general application.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Lagos was
a colonial territory; administrators visited, and missionaries
settled in, the interior Yoruba kingdoms, but these were not
brought within the Protectorate until the very end of the
century. West Africa was "the white man's grave" and the
number of expatriates remained small. From the outset Africans
filled most executive positions and a few rose to quite high
office in Church and State. In Lagos such men were usually
from the families of men who had been taken to Sierra Leone as
slaves where many had been converted and educated before
their return, not it should be noted to the towns and villages
of their birth, but to the new capital. Though of Yoruba
stock, many of these men had become alienated from traditional
Yoruba society. They tended to take as their reference group
the locally resident English; family portraits showing these
people - the men in their top hats and stiff winged collars,
women in crinolines and bustles, children in sailor suits -
demonstrate their slavish desire to conform. And although
these Lagosians were never completely accepted as social
equals by the English residents of the 1880s and l890s, the
degree of social mixing seems to have been greater at this
period than in subsequent decades. Nevertheless there were,
even then, some who, perhaps experiencing rejection, turnedore
to Yoruba society, wearing Yoruba dress, writing books and
pamphlets on Yoruba culture. Such rejection accounts, in
part, for the foundation of the African Churches.
After 1900 the situation changed radically. Colonial
rule became more highly developed; an evangelical revival
provided more missionaries; malaria was largely conquered
39
by quinine, and as before, Englishmen resented working
under Nigerians. Nigerians were restricted to the "junior
service" or executive posts. The only openings for the
better educated were in the independent professions - law and
medicine. (In the mid 1920s, Nigeria had but thirty lawyers
and doctors, mostly resident in Lagos.) Parallel processes
halted the development of entrepreneurship. Lagos had a number
of prominent traders at the turn of the century but, for a
number of reasons, most of these businesses died with their
creators; on the other hand the expatriate firms tended to
amalgamate, and such giants as the United Africa Company
emerged to control much of Nigeria's total trade. The small
group of professionals, property owners and traders dominated
Lagos' social life in the 1920s and 1930s. Their political
demands were of a liberal nature - an extension of elective
government, more education, free trade, africanisation of
the public service.
It was this social group which created the Action Group,
the party which governed the Western Region of Nigeria in
the l950s. The electoral support, for the party which
ensured their success at the polis came from the local elite -
a category comprising traditional chiefs and rulers, many of
whom were by this time literate men, and traders, produce
buyers, lorry owners, all deriving their wealth ultimately
from cocoa, and who were predominantly traditionally oriented,
semi-literate, living in their family compounds, and with
few exceptions unknown outside their own towns and districts.
The same decolonisation process which brought the Action
Group to power also contributed to the rapid expansion of
secondary and university education. But it was not until
1953-4 that the intake of expatriates into the permanent
civil service stopped and that Nigerians were admitted in
large numbers. In the subsequent years Nigerianisation was
vigorously pursued; anti-British headlines dominated the
newspapers, though on the individual level personal relation-
ships remained good. In 1959 almost all the expatriate
permanent secretaries in the Western Region were replaced
by Nigerians. These civil servants (and others similarly
employed) acceded to the salary scales and perquisites of
the expatriates whom they replaced. They tended to be
young men (and sometimes women), drawn from a wide social
base - as many came from homes with illiterate parents as
from homes with primary-educated parents (the clerical elite
of the provincial towns).
For a brief period in time there appeared to be
polarisation in Yoruba society between the western-
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educated nationally-oriented meritocracy, stationed in the
regional and national capitals, enjoying a substantially
western style of life, and the locally traditionally
oriented chiefs, traders and peasants. One must not
overdraw the distinction - but it is a useful device
against which to measure the degree to which the educated
elite is pulled towards international elite society or to-
wards local Nigerian or Yoruba society.
The material self-interests of this educated elite would
seem to be three fold:
To preserve their privileged position in society
in terms of absolute levels of wealth, leisure, etc.;
To perpetuate this position in their own children
(an aspiration not found in traditional society, where
the numerous issue of polygynous chiefs followed a wide
range of occupations);
To raise the level of one's kin so that, in one's
exalted position, one is not disgraced by indigent (and
as a corollary perhaps criminal) relatives.
Since the completed nuclear family often contains six
children and the kin group is large, rapid economic expansion
is eagerly sought in order that sufficient elite or near-elite
positions are created. An increasing governmental control
of the economy would seem a logical response here. Further-
more, civil service and like salaried remained unchanged
throughout the l96Os, though the wages of workers rose with
the cost of living. Men were encouraged to seek additional
sources of income to supplement their salaries; such were
often found from the business sector through opportunities
created in the exercise of their official duties.
The lack both of capital and of technical and entre-
preneurial skills has prevented educated Yoruba from entering
the manufacturing sphere. Trading is highly regarded by the
Yoruba but does not yield the same initial income for a
university graduate as dbes a salaried post. Studies of
successful "modern" businessmen show that their education
is not an important factor in their success; other studies
have shown that government loans boards have had more than
enough money to finance the really viable projects. The
educated Yoruba has invested first and foremost in houses;
for with a salaried job he easily obtains a mortgage. The
better houses are rented to expatriate businessmen whose firms
are both loath to invest such capital in Nigeria and happy to
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win a local "patron". (The Yoruba land tenure and attitude
to land has inhibited speculation in undeveloped land.)
Similarly, the civil servant can invest his savings in trading
conducted by his wife, or small enterprises run by other
relatives - a taxi service, a privately run school, contrac-
ting business; he can himself, or through his colleagues,
ensure that permits, licences and the like are appropriately
allocated. The desire to promote local business enterprise
is reflected in a recent national enactment that certain
types of business are henceforth to be entirely reserved to
Nigerians, whilst in other prescribed types of business
with less than £200,000 capital, 40% of them must be Nigerian.
In a few fields, building construction for example,
Nigerian and expatriate businessmen compete on equal terms.
Eut almost all the recent growth in the manufacturing
sector is attributable to foreign enterprise - though some
of the investment may come from within Nigeria and though
Nigerians may occupy many managerial posts save those at the
very top or demanding advanced technical skills. Attitudes
towards these enterprises vary. At one extreme is the man
- usually a businessman - who is willing to go into partner-
ship with one of the established expatriate companies,
arguing that with these he may deal fairly and honestly,
even though it is these companies which have earned the
stigma of "exploiting" the country. At the other extreme
is the man - often a civil servant or politician - who, for
ideological reasons, rejects companies associated with the
erstwhile metropolitan country in favour of those from
the "uncommitted" nations who promise bargaindeals, more
perquisites in return for political favours, etc. At worst,
these fall prey to the most unscrupulous men, though the
loss falls on the nation - losing capital and saddled with
a worthless factory - rather than the individual civil
servant or politician.
As a non-economist, I would not dare to assert which of
the above strategies should yield the faster rate of economic
growth; nor would I predict the structural changes in the
economy to which each strategy would lead. I merely note
that state promotion of industry in Western Nigeria has
had very little success as yet. The growth of private busi-
ness, however, seems to be producing divisions within the
educated elite. Nigerian newspapers refer increasingly to
the income gap between rich and poor, inspite of the decreas-
ing gap between wages and salaries in the past decade. One
explanation of this is that the protests derive not from the
poor, but from those of the educated elite who have no other
source óf income than their salaries, and who are jealous
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of their colleagues who have used their greater income, official
positions, politial influence and so on to increase in wealth.
The educated elite strives to perpetuate its status in its
children and in so doing draws further away from the masses.
Elite parents probably endow their children with a better
genetic inheritance; in speaking English in the home and in
providing books and toys they impart those skills which are
necessary to academic success; they can afford the fees for
private primary and state subsidised secondary schools; they
use their influence to gain admission for their children
into the more prestigeous schools. Few of the university
educated elite have, as yet, children old enough to enter
university; but the evidence that exists suggests that
very many of them will do so, or be guided into alternative
channels which result in jobs of similar status.
Yet, as one drives through the provincial Yoruba towns and
villages, one is still impressed by the extravagant houses
of the local traders, built in the cocoa boom of the early
1950s. But the recent larger buildings are usually of more
modern design and belong to educated men, resident in Ibadan
or Lagos and anxious to identify with their home town.
Furthermore these men are increasingly active in its political
life. Local traders do still exist but they seem to be much
less inwardly oriented; they invest in education or in house
property in the cities; they see their business success as
dependent more on their contacts with the politically powerful
members of the national elite than on their local reputations
as beneficient leaders and patrons.
The gap between the national and local elite would seem
to be closing. As it does so the dependence of the national
elite upon both its international patrons and on the local
elites would seem to present a variety of patterns, often
containing conflicting elements. However, the tensions
which could arise in these situations must not be divorced
from that other sphere of conflict - that between the educated
elite and the peasants and urban workers. Here, too, we
cannot draw a simple picture for the conflicts of interest which
seem obvious to the external observer are often expressed very
differently by the Nigerian poor who still retain an image of a
rslatively open society. However, this image is not unchanging
and the increasing awareness of the lack of opportunities open
to the poor, the discrepancy between the minimum wage demanded
by the trade union leadership (E48 per month) and both existing
wage rates (average £10 per month) and the sum which the govern-
ment is likely to award, and the increasing press coverage of
debates on income distribution, all contribute to a greater
polarisation between the elite and the masses.
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